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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NAYLOR GROSS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, GARTH L. NAYLOR 
and TERRY GROSS, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
THOMAS K. BACKMAN and MILTON V. 
BACKMAN, Trustee, 
Defendants, Counter-
Claimant and Appellant. 
. 
. 
Case No. 18218 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this brief, Plaintiffs will use the same 
reference to the record and transcripts as proposed on page 2 of 
Defendant's Brief. 
On or about June 27, 1979, Plaintiffs entered into an 
agreement with the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, whereby 
Plaintiffs were to sell to the Defendant real property known as 
the Old Rock Mill Farm. The Old Rock Mill Farm is located in 
Farmington, Utah, and a restaurant known as the "Heidelberg" is 
located on the property. The sale was to include substantial 
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personal proeprty used in furnishing and operating the Heidelberg 
(R 46-48). 
Plaintiffs, Garth Naylor and Terry Gross, had reached 
the age of retirement and both were suffering from poor physical 
health. The property was sold to relieve the individual 
Plaintiffs of the burden of caring for the property and business 
and to provide each of them with sufficient income upon which to 
retire. 
The record contains the obligations as agreed to by the 
par-ties (R 6, 7, 43-45, 51, 52). Plaintiffs concede that the 
obligations of the parties are substantially those found on page 
3 of Defendant-Appellant's Brief but allege that the obligations 
relevant for purposes of this appeal are also found in the stipu-
lation of September 9, 1981 (Tl-1 to 19) and the discussions that 
accompanied it. 
After Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, took possession of 
the property disputes arose between the parties as to their 
respective obligations. 
Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, had not been making the 
$3, 000 monthly installments as per the agreement (R 6, 35, 44, 
51) and was in breach of the agreement. Plaintiffs filed suit in 
the Second Judicial District Court in December of 1980. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the agreement was breached by Thomas K. 
Backman and sought to have the real and personal property 
returned to them (R 1-7). Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, answered 
-2-
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the Complaint and filed a counterclaim, alleging that Plaintiffs 
were in breach and denied his own breach (R 11-16). 
The case proceeded through the discovery process during 
which time Defendant, Thomas K. Backman was less than cooperative 
and had to be compelled to respond to discovery (R 76-90). 
The case was set for trial on September 9, 1981 before 
the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer. On that day Plaintiffs and their 
counsel met with Judge Palmer and the Defendant in the Judge's 
Chambers. Defendant had been advised to obtain counsel but had 
chosen not to obtain counsel (T2-ll,12). The purpose of this 
meeting was to resolve the dispute without resorting to trial and 
the foundation of the discussions of that day was the idea that 
judgment would be entered if the settlement and stipulations of 
that day were not complied with. Based on that premise, 
Plaintiffs entered into settlement discussions with Defendant 
both on and off the record 
settlement and stipulation. 
regarding 
These on 
the possibilities of 
and off the record 
discussions were conducted both in and out of the presence of 
Judge Palmer. Much of what transpired that day was not recorded. 
At the conclusion of those discussions the parties had reached a 
settlement agreement which was stipulated into the record (Tl-1 
to 19). 
The purpose of the settlement was to ave.id the li tiga-
tion scheduled for that day and to resolve the dispute without 
resorting to litigation at all. Though the penalties for viola-
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tion of the stipulation were not expressly discussed on the 
record, Defendant expressly stipulated to judgment in the pre-
sence of the trial court judge, Plaintiff's counsel, and a repre-
sentative of Plaintiffs that in the event of Defendant's failure 
to comply with the terms of the stipulation, and if Plaintiffs 
did comply, judgment should be entered accordingly. Defendant 
was fully aware of the penalties and was so informed during the 
discussions preceeding introduction of the stipulation into the 
record. 
The essence of the stipulation (Tl-1 to 19) is that 
Plaintiffs would be liable for any debts or liabilities that 
existed at the time of the sale of the property in excess of 
$110,000 based on Defendant's own figures. The parties were also 
to decide which debts or liabilities Plaintiffs would assume to 
limit Defendant's liabilities to $110, 000 and Defendant would 
make the payments and perform the. obligations required by the 
earlier sale agreement. 
Plaintiffs were at all times ready and willing to 
discuss with Defendant as to which debts Plaintiffs would relieve 
Defendant of liability. As during discovery, Defendant remained 
uncooperative (R 163), so Plaintiffs, through their counsel, sub-
mitted a letter (R 169-172) to Defendant informing him of which 
debts they would be willing to assume so that they could in good 
faith abide by the stipulation of September 9, 1981. Plaintiffs 
chose to assume these debts because this was consistent with the 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discussions between themselves and the Defendant prior to the 
stipulation. The Defendant particularly induced Plaintiffs to 
assume the state sales tax that had accrued before the sale of 
the property to Defendant. The failure-of Defendant to cooperate 
in helping finalize the full determination as to which debts 
Plaintiffs would assume is a breach of the September 9, 1981 sti-
pulation {Tl 3,4) and the June 27, 1979 Sales Agreement {R 51). 
As Defendant was aware, Plaintiffs, as retired indivi-
duals, were without substantial assets and income to pay the 
debts in excess of $110,000 {R 220, 221, 224, 225) and were 
relying on the good faith efforts of Thomas K. Backman to fulfill 
his obligation to pay monthly installments as per their 
agreement, in order to provide Plaintiffs the required funds to 
pay the obligations in excess of $110,000, although it was 
clearly agreed that assumption itself was sufficient. 
The transcript of September 9, 1981 {Tl-3) evidences 
that Plaintiffs were to satisfy .2!. assume any debts in excess of 
$110,000. The stipulation is in the alternative, requiring 
Plaintiffs to satisfy .2!. assume the debts and take upon them-
selves any future liability for certain debts to be agreed upon 
by the parties. Plaintiffs did assume all debts in excess of 
$110, 000 based on Defendants own records including the debt to 
the Utah State Tax Commission which Defendant had induced them to 
assume {R 219, 220), although Plaintiffs were unable to pay said 
debts in full until Defendant complied with the stipulation and 
-5-
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paid them the monies due and owing. 
Plaintiffs did fulfill all that was required of them in 
the stipulation by assuming the debts in excess of $110,000 
though those debts have not yet been satisfied. 
Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, did not abide by the sti-
pulation and did not pay to Plaintiffs the required sums and was 
in breach of both the Sales Agreement and the stipulation. Judge 
Palmer ordered on October 8, 1981 that if Defendant did not 
comply with the stipulation and if Plaintiffs did, the interest 
of Thomas K. Backman in the Old Rock Farm and the personal pro-
perty thereon or affixed thereto would be termianted (R 146, 
14 7). 
On December 24, 1982 the trier of fact, Judge J. Duffy 
Palmer, concluded that Defendant had indeed expressly stipulated 
to judgment in the event Plaintiffs complied with the stipulation 
and Defendant did not. The court found that Defendant did not 
comply, that Plaintiffs did comply, and that Plaintiffs were 
entitled to judgment. Judgment was entered for Plaintiffs (R 
182-185). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was set for trial on September 9, 1981 but 
the parties entered into a stipulation in lieu of trial. Each of 
the parties agreed to perform certain acts. Plaintiffs were to 
satisfy .2!. assume certain debts and Defendant was to fulfill his 
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obligations as per the June 27, 1979 Sales Agreement between the 
parties. In effect, Defendant was to do what he was already 
bound to do. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel and 
Defendant was acting .E.!2. ~' against the advice of Judge Palmer. 
The trier of fact determined that Plaintiffs had 
complied with the stipulation and that Defendants had not. 
Judgment was entered for Plaintiffs pursuant to the stipulation 
of the parties before Judge Palmer, terminating Defendant's 
interest in the property. From that judgment Defendant takes 
this appeal. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT. THEY 
DID HAVE CLEAN HANDS AND DID COMPLY WITH THE 
STIPULATION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. 
On September 9, 1981, when the parties were before Judge 
Palmer, they stipulated that Defendant would satisfy or assume 
existing liabilities up to a sum of $110,000. This was hardly a 
gracious concession on Defendant's part as Defendant was already 
obligated so to do as the "down payment" under the June 27, 1979 
Sales Agreement (R 6, 51). The stipulation also required 
Defendant to bring his payments of $3,000 per month current and 
continue them on a monthly basis. Defendant was already required 
by the Sales Agreement to perform all these acts. 
Plaintiffs agreed to pay .2£ assume all other debts of 
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the business sold to Defendant which exceeded that $110, 000 
amount. The parties did agree pursuant to Defendant's suggestion 
and inducement that one such debt that Plaintiffs would assume 
was a tax liability of $8, 325. 60 owed to the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
Plaintiffs did assume liability for the debts in excess 
of $110,000 including the $8,325.60 owed the State Tax Commission 
and thus complied with the stipulation. Plaintiffs were and are 
ready to hold Defendant harmless for the aforementioned debts. 
It should be noted that the stipulation was in the alternative, 
satisfy .2!. assume the debts. In fact, Plaintiffs would have 
satisfied the debts if Defendant had complied with the stipula-
tion and brought the monthly payments current and continued 
making the payments. As previously stated in the Statement of 
Facts, Plaintiffs had retired and the funds from the sale of the 
property were Plaintiffs only real source of income. 
Defendant alleges in his brief that Plaintiffs failed to 
comply with the stipulation because they did not pay the tax 
obligation or obtain a release from the State Tax Commission. 
While it is true that Plaintiffs did neither, it is not true that 
the stipulation required those acts. Plaintiffs did assume the 
tax liability and were and are ready · and willing to hold 
Defendant harmless and indemnify him against that liability. 
Further, Plaintiffs would have satisfied that obligation had the 
funds owed them, as set forth in the stipulation, been paid. 
-8-
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Defendant also argues that a Utah Statute, Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 59-15-10 prohibits Plaintiffs from assuming 
the tax debt of $8,375.60 because the statute places the liabi-
lity on Defendant. Having induced the Plaintiffs to assume this 
obligation and so agreed in formal stipulation, it is incon-
sistent and inequitable for Defendant to argue that statutory law 
prohibits enforcement of the stipulation. In fact, Defendant's 
position is not well taken in light of case law regarding the 
statute. 
In Dayton .Y..:.. Gibbons ~ Reed Company, 365 P.2d 801 {Utah 
1961), this court construed-the very sales and use tax provisions 
of the code which Defendant claims places the liability on him 
and make the stipulation ineffective. In construing Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 59-15-1 Et. Seq. through Section 59-16-1 Et. 
Seq. the court held: 
Irt the absence of a statutory prohibition, 
there appears no reason why a party who is sui 
juris cannot contract to pay obligations for 
which a statute makes the other liable. Id. 
at 802. 
The court held that the statute did not prevent the par-
ties from contracting that as between themselves the seller will 
pay the taxes due. 
It is clear that the parties are sui juris, and that 
Section 59-15-10 Utah Code Annotated, contains no prohibition 
against another assuming the tax liability in issue. Defendant's 
-9-
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argument that the statute prohibits shifting the tax burden is 
untenable in light of case law. 
It is clear then that Plaintiffs need no·t satisfy the 
tax debt or get a release, but need only assume the obligation by 
contract as they have done. Plaintiffs' actions were consistent 
with the stipulation and the applicable case law. 
Defendant claims that Plaintiffs do not have "clean 
hands" and cannot seek enforcement of the stipulation, order and 
judgment. Plaintiffs have over extended themselves to bring this 
dispute to an equitable solution. They assumed new respon-
sibilities pursuant to the stipulation that were not imposed by 
the Sales Agreement. They assumed those debts that Defendant 
induced them to assume. They have been ready and willing to 
resolve this dispute in an amicable fashion. 
The "clean hands" that Defendant argues should reverse 
the order and judgment below should be used to strangle 
Defendant's appeal to this court. Defendant entered and took 
possession of the property and has operated the property prof i-
tably. He has failed to pay the Plaintiffs for the property, (or 
even to pay the initial down payment which was to be paid by 
satisfying the $110,000 of debts) as required by the Sales 
Agreement. He assumed no new responsibilities under the stipula-
tion and did not comply with that stipulation. Here is a man who 
would ke~p Plaintiffs' property and not pay them for it (T2-ll, 
12) • 
-10-
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It is resoectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
District Court be affirmed. 
POINT II 
NOTICE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO DEFENDANT THAT 
JUDGMENT WOULD BE REQUESTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
THOUGH COPIES OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND JUDGMENT 
WERE NOT RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT UNTIL AFTER 
JUDGMENT HAD BEEN ENTERED. 
Defendant would mislead this court into believing that 
he never knew that judgment would be requested upon the stipula-
tion. The record conclusively demonstrates the bad faith of this 
argument. Defendant_ himself in a letter to Judge Palmer (R 140) 
affirms that he knew of the proposed Order and Judgment that 
would accompany it. A copy of the Motion to approve the Order 
was sent to Defendant on September 24, 1981 (R 155, 156). The 
October 8, 1981 Minute Entry (R 154) evidences that Defendant was 
present, again without counsel, and made objections to the 
judgment and order. A copy of that Order was mailed to Plaintiff 
on October" 7, 1981 (R 146, 147). Defendant's argument then is 
that he did not know the precise date and time that judgment was 
to be entered and did not have an opportunity to appear and be 
heard on December 24, 1981, the day of the judgment itself. 
Plaintiffs submit that Defendant had sufficient pre-judgment 
opportunities to object to and raise defenses to the judgment of 
December 24, 1981. In addition, Defendant had post-judgment 
opportunities to present his case (T2, T3). 
-11-
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The cons ti tutionali ty of the procedure used by Judge 
Palmer in handing down the judgment will be more fully discussed 
in the next succeeding response to Defendant's argument, but 
Plaintiffs submit that the judgment of the trial court was pro-
perly entered and should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE GRANTING OF THE DECEMBER 24, 1981 JUDGMENT 
WAS NOT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. 
Plaintiffs concede that the United States and Utah 
Constitutions require due process before a deprivation of pro-
perty may occur. Plaintiffs also concede that the judgment 
deprives Defendant of property. This deprivation in no way 
violates due process however. 
In ™ .Y..:. Grantsville City, 610 P. 2d 338 (Utah 1980) 
this court stated: 
"Due process" is not a technical concept with 
a fixed context unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances which can be imprisoned within 
the treacherous limits of any formula. Rather 
the demands of due process rest on the concept 
of basic fairness of procedure and demand a 
procedure appropriate to the case and just to 
the parties involved." Id. at 341. 
When we view the instant action in" light of time, place, 
circumstance and basic fairness, we find that there has been no 
due process violation. 
Defendant knew months in advance that the judgment would 
-12-
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be sought by Plaintiffs if he did not comply with the stipula-
tion. He personally appeared before the court on October 8, 1981 
and had an opportunity to object that he had not stipulated to 
judgment (R 154). He also submitted a letter to the court 
objecting to the Order, Stipulation and Judgment (R 140). In 
addition, Defendant had two opportunities to present his views 
and have the judgment vacated (T2, T3). 
The trier of fact, based on all of the relevant evidence 
and basic fairness ordered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, 
finding that Defendant had not complied with the stipulation and 
in that event had stipulated to judgment (R 182-185). 
The court was not without power to embody the stipula-
tion into a judgment though Defendant denied that he stipulated 
to judgment, was recalcitrant and uncooperative [(see Bear v. 
Carlos, 445 P.2d_ 144 (Utah 1968)]. In any event, the judgment of 
the trial court did not become final until March 23, 1982 (R 258, 
259) and Defendant had ample opportunity to present additional 
evidence to persuade Judge Palmer to ·vacate the judgment. 
There was no due process violation resulting in depriva-
tion of Defendant's property. Even had there been such a depri-
vation on December 24, 1981, the record is replete with examples 
of times, places and opportunities for the deprivation to have 
been cured. Plaintiffs were even attempting to settle with 
Defendant after judgment was entered (T2, T3) and have been more 
than equitable with the Defendant as has Judge Palmer of the 
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District Court. 
affirmed. 
The Order and Judgment of the District Court should be 
POINT IV 
THE ISSUES OF FACT RELEVANT TO THIS CASE WERE 
RESOLVED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
In Point IV of Defendant's argument on appeal, he alle-
ges that there were issues of fact which were not resolved and 
that judgment was thus improper. 
Defendant apparently misunderstands the role of the 
trial court. Judge Palmer was the trier of fact and concluded 
that the facts warranted judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
Though the Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 9 authorizes 
this Court to review the law and the facts in equity cases, this 
Court in the case of Stone ~ Stone, 431 P. 2d 802, 803 (Utah 
1967) held this this Court should take into account the advan-
taged position of the trial judge. By entering the Order and 
Judgment, Judge Palmer concluded that there were no unresolved 
factual disputes and that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment. 
This judgment should not be lightly set aside based on the bare 
allegations of Defendant that there are still unresolved facts. 
Defendant also argues under this point of his appeal 
that the procedure followed by the court below was similar to 
that of a Motion for Summary Judgment. How does that entitle 
-14-
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Defendant to relief? lt does not. The case of Pioneer Savings ~ 
Loan Association v. Pioneer Finance~ Thrift Co., 417 P.2d 121 
(Utah 1966) is dispositive of the issue. In that case this Court 
held: 
The trial judge not only can but should g~ant 
a motion for Summary Judgment if he feels cer-
tain that he would rule that way no matter 
what proof a party could produce in support of 
his contentions. Id. at 123 
If the judgment was procedurally the same or similar to 
a Motion for Summary Judgment as Defendant alleges, it would have 
made no difference if Defendant had been allowed to present aff i-
davits if Judge Palmer felt certain that Plaintiffs were entitled 
to Judgment. That Judge Palmer was certain that Plaintiffs were 
entitled to judgment is clearly evident by the judgment (R 
182-185) and the Transcripts (T2-11, 12) (T3-3, 4). 
The issues of fact have been resolved by the trier of 
fact and judgment was entered accordingly. The judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE COURT ON OCTOBER 8, 
1981 WHICH APPROVED OF THE WRITTEN STIPULATION 
DID NOT GO BEYOND THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
AND WAS PROPERLY ENTERED. 
As previously stated in this brief, the parties met on 
September 9, 1981 at the time the case was set for trial. 
-15-
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Discussions·· were held on and off the record, in and out of the 
presence of the court. The stipulation entered into was done for 
the purpose of avoiding trial altogether. This clearly was the 
intent of Plaintiffs and the understanding of the trial court 
(T3-3) (T2-12). 
The thrust of Defendant's argument on this point is that 
he did not stipulate to judgment in the event of his failure to 
abide by the stipulation. It is true, as Defendant claims, that 
there is no clue in the September 9, 1981 transcript (Tl-1 to 19) 
that judgment would be taken against the party failing to abide 
by the stipulation. But this court held long ago in Smithfield 
~Bench Irr. Co • .Y.!.. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 195 P.2d 249, 
254 (Utah 1948) that a stipulation entered into by parties to a 
suit is to be construed in light of the situation at the time of 
the execution of the stipulation. 
The stipulation in the instant action should be 
construed in ligpt of the circumstances of September 9, 1981. 
Trial was to be held that day. Defendant had been advised by the 
court to obtain counsel but failed to heed that advice, judging 
himself to be sufficiently astute to handle the proceedings of 
the day. rt- was clear to everyone but Defendant .that judgment 
would be entered upon non-compliance with the stipulation as 
reaffirmed by the court in the hearing on that very issue on 
October 8, 1981 (R 154). In attempting in good faith and 
conscience to settle the dispute, Plaintiffs, through ·their coun-
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sel, assumed new obligations. Defendant merely agreed to perform 
what he was already bound by contract to perform. Plaintiffs' 
counsel in no way attempted to take advantage of Defendant as 
Defendant alleges and to the contrary saw fit to have his clients 
assume new obligations relieving Defendant of certain liabili-
ties. 
If Defendant was in a disadvantaged position it was 
Defendant's own actions that placed him there. "A court of 
equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself from 
circumstances which he has created." Battistone Y:_ American Land 
and Development Co., 607 P.2d at 839 (Utah 1980). Defendant's 
claims that the stipulation should be interpreted within the 
walls of the stipulation of record and that it should be 
construed against the party represented by counsel flies in the 
face of case law requiring stipulations to be construed in light 
of all the circumstances at the time of execution. 
Plaintiffs should not suffer because Defendant misun-
derstood or chose to misunderstand the stipulation or because 
Defendant chose not to have an attorney advocate for his rights. 
It is submitted that the October 8, 1981 Order was properly 
entered by the court and did not exceed the stipulation of the 
parties. The judgment of the District Court in favor of 
Plaintiffs was entered by the trier of fact based on the relevant 
facts which were known to the trial court. ~hat judgment should 
be affirmed and this court should not extricate Defendant from a 
position he has created. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant has come before this court urging that equity 
should restrain enforcement of the judgment against him and 
alleging that Plaintiffs have unclean hands. 
we can analyze the role of Defendant and Plaintiffs in 
this controversy to determine who is the party with unclean hands 
and to whom equity should grant relief. 
Defendant refuses to acknowledge that he stipulated to 
judgment though Judge Palmer so found. Defendant merely stipu-
lated to certain settlement terms which he was already obligated 
by contract to perform. Defendant induced Plaintiffs to assume 
certain tax obligations and now alleges that the stipulation is 
ineffective because Plaintiffs so assumed them. Defendant had to 
be compelled to respond to discovery and refused to cooperate 
with Plaintiffs in finalizing which obligations Plaintiffs would 
assume under the stipulation although Plaintiffs were willing to 
and did use all of Defendant's figures as to amounts that were 
owing. Defendant refused to obtain counsel though advised so to 
do by Judge Palmer and now alleges that Plaintiffs' counsel has 
exercised unfair advantage over him. Finally, Defendant has 
been in possession for more than three (3) years of property for 
which he has neither paid Plaintiffs nor in fact even paid the 
required down payment, and has used dilatory tactics to avoid 
making payments. To permit further retention by Defendant would 
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unjustly enrich Defendant and severely penalize Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have tried to settle this dispute amicably. 
They did not force Defendant to litigate the matter .E!.2. ~ on 
September 9, 1981 but rather agreed to assume new obligations and 
relieve Defendant of certain liabilities, while Defendant agreed 
to do only a portion of what he was already bound by contract to 
do. Plaintiffs assumed the debts agreed upon by the parties 
based on Defendant's own figures and are even now willing to 
fully indemnify Defendant against any liability as per the stipu-
lation. Even after obtaining judgment the Plaintiffs have 
attempted to settle this amicably without strictly enforcing the 
judgment. 
"As a predicate to equitable relief, a party must exer-
cise reasonable efforts to discharge his own obligations." 
Bradford~ Alvey~ Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). Plaintiffs 
have done so. Defendant has not. 
It is Defendant that comes to this court with unclean 
hands. Equity and the law should enforce the judgment against 
the Defendant. It is respectfully submitted that the court 
should follow the instruction it gave in Jacobson v. Jacobson, 
557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976) wherein it stated: 
-19-
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"It -is ••• well established that because of the 
.advantaged position of the trial court, we 
give considerable deference to his findings 
and judgment. It is inherent in the nature 
and purpose of equity that it will grant 
relief only when fairness and good conscience 
so demand. Correlated to this is the precept 
that equity does not reward one who is engaged 
in fraud or deceit in the business under con-
sideration, but reserves its rewards for those 
who are themselves acting in fairness and good 
conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those 
who have come into court with clean hands." 
Id. at 158. 
Plaintiffs come into this court with clean hands. 
Defendant does not. The judgment of the District Court should be 
affirmed. 
1982. 
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